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Africa has recently become a region of strategic importance for both the U.S. and 
China, which has resulted in what some have called The third scramble for Africa. Both 
countries are actively competing for Africa's natural resources, for markets and for 
political influence, using several strategies and tactics to ensure and expand their 
interests. This dissertation aims to analyse the main actions and reactions taken by the 
U.S. in Africa, regarding China's presence on the continent. It examines the two 
countries cooperation policy and their interests in Africa as well as the measures that 
have been taken by the U.S. to strengthen its strategic policy in Africa. It concludes that, 
even though the U.S. is using diplomatic, military and economic instruments to counter 
China's influence on the continent, it doesn't intend to attack China directly. Instead, the 
U.S. is employing a "smart power" policy characterized by cautiousness.     	  
 











A África tornou-se mais recentemente uma região de grande importância estratégica 
para os EUA e a China, resultando, na visão de alguns autores, numa nova corrida pela 
África. Ambos os países estão activamente a competir por recursos naturais, por 
mercados económicos e por influência política, no continente Africano, utilizando 
várias estratégias para assegurar e expandir os seus interesses. A presente dissertação 
tem como principal objectivo apresentar as principais acções e reacções desenvolvidas 
pelos EUA no continente africano, assumindo a presença cada vez mais forte da China 
em África. A dissertação analisa a política de cooperação dos dois países e os seus 
interesses no continente, bem como as medidas tomadas pelos EUA para reforçar a sua 
política estratégica no continente, como resposta  às acções desenvolvidas pela China. A 
partir da analise realizada pode-se concluir que, apesar dos EUA utilizarem vários 
instrumentos diplomáticos, militares e económicos para conter a influência da China no 
continente, a intenção de Washington não é atacar a China directamente. Em vez disso, 
os EUA estão a empregar uma política de "smart power" caracterizada essencialmente 
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Over the last decade, Africa has become a strategic region for new emerging 
powers, such as China, Brazil, India, Russia, for the European countries that once 
dominated the continent and also for the U.S.  Not since the end of the Cold War has the 
U.S. been so actively involved in a scramble over political, economic and geostrategic 
interests on the distant continent. What’s more, the opponent, as with the ex-USSR, is 
another communist state: China. 
The key reason for Africa’s growing importance on the international scene is quite 
obvious: Africa is home to some of the largest deposits of natural resources in the 
world, from rare metals, rare earth, non-ferrous and ferrous metals, to fossil fuel such as 
oil and gas.1 Its impressive natural heritage has been the main reason for what some 
have called The Third Scramble for Africa - “competition for control of strategic 
resources” (YI-CHONG, 2008.p16) - with China, the U.S. and the European countries 
actively competing against each other for Africa’s natural resources, for markets and for 
political influence. 
The increasing presence of China in Africa has drawn a lot of controversy and strong 
criticism among some Western countries2, which perceive Chinese foreign policy for 
Africa as a growing threat to their own interests. It is increasingly evident that Chinese 
economic involvement in several African countries has forced the traditional African 
partners, particularly Europe and the U.S., to reassess its strategic political cooperation 
with the continent.	  Therefore, taking into account China's influence on the continent, in 
recent years the U.S. has shown a growing interest in Africa in order to ensure access to 
energy resources, gain a geostrategic position and political influence in African 
countries, using several strategies and tactics to achieve its objectives. 	  
This dissertation seeks to provide a basis for reflection and discussion regarding the 
main actions and reactions taken by the U.S. in Africa, regarding China's presence on 
the continent. More significantly, it aims to answer the following question: Has Chinese 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Figure No.1 and No.2 
2	  About the myths of China’s presence in Africa see BRAUTINGAM, (2009)	  
2	  
	  
presence in Africa prompted an increase in American involvement on the continent, and 
if so, in what way?  
Besides this, there are a set of other objectives to support this overall aim: (i) to 
understand the U.S. and China cooperation policy and their interests in Africa, (ii) to 
analyse how the "soft power" policy employed by China undermines the U.S. strategic 
plans in Africa; (iii) to examine what measures have been taken to strengthen the U.S. 
strategic policy in Africa as a response to China’s presence in Africa and comprehend if 
there is an action - reaction effect. These objectives will help to test the central 
hypothesis: China is one of the main reasons that led the U.S. to engage with key 
African countries over securing its strategic interests, controlling China’s growing 
international stature on the continent.	  
In terms of methodology, this study will follow the deductive approach based on the 
observation of empirical reality, taking into account a variety of disciplines such as 
History, Geopolitics, Political Science, International Relations and Economics.  
The dissertation is divided into four chapters: the paper begins by exploring the 
theoretical basis for the research topic presented here, based on the theory of IR. The 
second chapter examines the U.S.’s foreign policy towards Africa and its interests on 
the continent. Chapter three describes the Chinese foreign policy and geo-economic 
strategy for the continent, exploring at the same time its interests in Africa. Chapter four 
addresses the implications of China's initiatives for the U.S. foreign policy in Africa. 
The chapter will also discuss various U.S. political, economic and military/security 
reactions to China's presence in Africa. Finally, the dissertation presents the main 
conclusions arising from the work and suggests some topics for future research. 
It should also be noted that the research topic presented here, which has raised a number 
of political, economic, and geostrategic questions among academics, politicians, 
analysts and observers, is also an important issue for the international balance of power 
whose implications are still far from known. 	  
Furthermore, it’s important to acknowledge that the dissertation is not exempt from 
imperfections and criticism, nor can it be seen as complete. 
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CHAPTER	  I	  	  
THEORETICAL	  FRAMEWORK	  
By analysing the main paradigms of international relations (IR) theory, this chapter 
attempts to provide a relevant framework about the political relations between states and 
their behaviour in international context. 	  
Since the beginning of International Relations, which is often thought to be marked by 
the Treaty of Westphalia3, many scholars have tried to develop a wide variety of 
theories that could contribute to a better understanding of the international environment.  
Taking into account the great variety of theoretical perspectives, the existence of five 
major conceptions of IR it is often accepted: realism; idealism/ liberalism; society of 
states; pluralist – interdependent and neo-Marxism. There are, however, other authors 
who consider other main paradigms.4  
The idealism approach of IR, that dominated the period between the two World Wars, 
underlies the belief that IR should be governed by certain ethical principles to achieve 
peace and harmony between independent entities. The idealists share a common interest 
for peace and for an international balance of power. They believe that international 
behaviour can be ordered through the use of rational mechanisms and legal institutions. 
Furthermore, idealists hold that cooperation is the central feature of international 
activity, which can control the warring passions of the states. The revival of 
idealism/liberalism thinking about international politics was accelerated by the 
development of neo-liberalism in the 80’s. Neo-liberalism seeks to understand the 
behaviour of states through the institutions. Keohane believes that "the behaviour of 
states is highly conditioned (but not determined) by the institutions" (KEOHANE, 1989, 
p.2). 5  The International Institutions are seen as purely utilitarian, being able to reduce 
the hostile international environment and allowing states to pursue common interests. 
Regarding states’ interests, some authors like Joseph Nye, argue that in order to achieve 
their goals, states should use “soft power” 6 - the ability of a country to persuade others 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 According to the international relations theorists the Treaty of Westphalia established the system of 
sovereign states with equal rights and protection from the intrusion of other states. 
4 See for instance EVANS and NEWHAM,(1998); JACKSON and SORENSEN,(2007). Due to the space 
limitation I decided to focus only on the realism and liberalism approach.  
5 KEOHANE, Robert, O., (1989), International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International 
Relations Theory, Boulder, Co., Westview Press in CRAVINHO, (2006, p. 223)	  
6 The concept of soft power was developed in his book Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of 
American Power (1990).  
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to do what it wants without force or coercion and without having to use “hard power” 
based on “military intervention, coercive diplomacy, and economic sanctions” (NYE, 
1990, p. 166). In Nye’s opinion, sometimes a nation can achieve its goals only “by 
employing the attractiveness of nation’s foreign policy, values and culture” (NYE, 
2004). He also argues that because the results of “soft power” are more diffuse and 
harder to achieve, states could also use a combination of hard and soft power – a 
synergy that leads to “smart power”. “Power in the global information age” Nye asserts 
“will include a soft dimension of attraction as well as the hard combinations of 
coercion and inducement” (NYE, 2008, p. 107).  
On the other hand, the realist theory of IR, introduced mainly by Carr7 and 
Morgenthau8, arises in contrast to the idealist school of thought, which, according to the 
realists, failed to understand the international system leading to the Second World War. 
The main premise of realism is that there are fixed rules, which regulate individual and 
state behaviour: states, like man, are by nature self-interested and aggressive and will 
pursue their interests to the detriment of others. Inspired by Machiavelli (16th century), 
but essentially by Hobbes (17th century)9, realism’s point of departure is that the 
structure of the international system explains the behaviour of states and the aspects of 
IR. According to both classical and contemporary realists, the absence of a central 
authority is the essential feature of the contemporary international system. The idea of 
international anarchy10, is based on Thomas Hobbes concept of state of nature, 
according to which the “life” between all men is a permanent war of “all against all”, 
since states will use all their political power to promote their interests and there’s no one 
else that they can depend on but themselves. Furthermore, since states naturally seek to 
maximize their power in order to intimidate the weaker states, the level of mutual 
suspicion is constantly high.11 	  
The aggressive intent of states combined with the lack of world government, means that 
conflict is an unavoidable and ever-present reality of IR, meaning that we live in - what 
Aron called - “the shadow of war” (ARON, 2002, p. 54). Classical realists generally 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 (CARR, 1981) 
8 (MORGENTHAU and THOMPSON, 1985) 
9 It is also important to mention the Greek historian Thucydides, who was one of earliest scholars to 
reflect on the conflict dimension of IR, especially on Peloponnesian Wars between Sparta and Athens 
(431-404. BC).  
10 Anarchy is seen as formal and it should be understood as order, stability and as a form of regulating the 
interactions among independent units.  
11 See also (HOBBES, 1949)	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assume that states12 are the central players in the international system, which has its 
roots in “human natures”. According to Morgenthau“political realism believes that 
politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in 
human nature”.13 The interaction between the “egoistic passions” and international 
anarchy marks the concept of “power” as the theoretical core of IR. Thus, international 
politics is a game consisting of the use of power and the demand of power (“power” 
being the instrument and the goal of participation in the international system). The 
assumption behind this premise is that the accumulation of “power” is the states’ 
foremost foreign policy objective. In addition, Morgenthau believes that states have 
irreconcilable interests and each seeks to promote its interests in the most convenient 
way.14 	  
Classical realism has been the dominant model of IR during the past six decades. 
Nevertheless, the classical version has received a lot of critical scrutiny. One of the most 
important approaches that redesigned the view of classical realism was neo-realism 
thought. Neo-realism shares many core assumptions of classical realism; however its 
defenders argue that it is the nature of the anarchic structure that explains the units’ 
behavior. That is, the neo-realists believe that only a systemic theory can explain the 
nature of international context (WALTZ, 2002). 
The beginning of neo-realism was marked by Kenneth Waltz’s book A Theory of 
International Politics (1979). Neo-realism seeks to identify the structure of international 
anarchy in order to create explanatory theories of international behavior, considering 
many system-level theories as reductionists. In contrast to classical realism, neo-realists 
dismiss the role of human nature, focusing instead on a “top-down” approach where the 
“structure” of the international system plays the leading role in the relationships 
between states rather than the nature of the individual (DONNELLY, 2004, p. 24).  
According to Waltz, the contemporary system is anarchic and decentralized rather than 
hierarchical. Order is not imposed by a supreme authority “but arises from the 
interactions of formally equal political actor” (DONNELLY, 2004, p. 17). 
Furthermore, in anarchic environments in Waltz’s view “each unit’s incentive is to put 
itself in a position to be able to take care of itself since no one else can be counted on to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Note that states are seen as the dominant and unitary units because they act uniformly in the 
international system, and rational because they pursue to protect their national interests.  
13 (MORGENTHAU and THOMPSON, 1985, p. 4) See also (NIEBUHR, 1932). 
14 See also (CARR, 1981), (NIEBUHR, 1932, pp. 56-76)	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do so”. 15 The main difference between states is “of capabilities, not function”. Waltz 
argues that states differ not so much in what they seek to achieve, but in their 
capabilities to achieve goals that are largely shared. Moreover, in an anarchic order, the 
most important thing is how the states’ capabilities are distributed among themselves, 
and how much power a particular state has in relation to others. The desire of each state 
to maximize relative power16 constrains each other, resulting in a “balance of power”. 
This situation gives rise to the “security dilemma” 17 which all nations face.   
Furthermore, for neo-realists although material power matters, it is not an end to itself, 
but an instrument. As Zakaria notes, states seek to maximize influence, not power, or to 
put it differently “states seek to maximize opportunities for implementing their 
preferences”.18 That is why states should seek to distribute the power between allies to 
ensure its leadership for longer. Regarding the balance of power, defensive realists 
agree that states have every interest in maintaining the existing balance of power that 
provides stability with survival being the main motive of states. Thus, the state’s foreign 
policy should be characterized by “cautiousness, alliance building, and interest-based 
interaction with other states” (KHALID, 2007, p. 46)  
On the other hand, offensive realists argue that states are not often satisfied with the 
simple balance of power. According to Mearsheimer, “a state's ultimate goal is to be 
the hegemon in the system".19 Since global hegemony is “almost impossible”, a great 
power has two goals: to dominate its region and prevent other powers from dominating 
other regions. 20 
Concluding, both classical and contemporary realism are adequate tools to help us 
understand the state’s behaviour and motivations. Although often considered too 
simplistic and pessimistic, the realism approach provides us a guide on how states 
actually try to survive in a world whose nature is unlikely to change. It is worth noting 
that this framework will serve as a background for the analysis I intend to pursue.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 WALTZ, Kenneth, (1979), Theory of International Politics, Reading, MA: Addison–Wesley Pub. Co., 
p.107, in DONNELLY (2004, p.17) 
16 Relative power is the perceived amount of power that a state has in relation to other state. 
17 This means that each state acts diplomatically and militarily to ensure its security and by acting in this 
way, the other states interpret its action as threatening.  
18 ZAKARIA, F., (1998), From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, in TELBAMI (2002, p. 160). 
19 MEARSHEIMER, Jonh J. (2001), The tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: W.W. Norton, in 
KHALID (2007, p. 46). 




CHAPTER	  II	  	  	  
U.S	  INTERESTS	  AND	  FOREIGN	  POLICY	  TOWARDS	  AFRICA:	  FROM	  
BACKWATER	  TO	  STRATEGIC	  IMPORTANCE	  
  
Taking into consideration the power relations between the States there is a clear 
difference of how China and the U.S. are engaging with Africa. The foreign policies 
adopted by each country fit within a large context of national interests, and the way 
these policies are implemented generate different results for each country.   
1. THE	  U.S.	  FOREIGN	  POLICY	  TOWARDS	  AFRICA	  
The end of the Cold War marked a major challenge for American policy towards Africa. 
The difficulty in defining a set of national interests in the region which could make a 
more proactive foreign policy, made Africa to be seen as a national interest backwater, 
not deserving the attention from the top decision makers -“Africa was never really a big 
part of the strategic plan”.21 As Chris Alden notes, traditionally US-Africa relations 
have been “characterized in the main by indifference and neglect, punctuated by 
flurries of interest and action” (ALDEN C. , 2000, p. 355).  
After the Second World War, U.S. African policy was determined by a continuous 
effort to impose American values of democracy and human rights, constituting the base 
of the U.S. “rhetorical Commitments to Africa”. However, the manner in which these 
objectives were pursued generally remained shaped by U.S. geo-strategic interests – 
“containing the Soviet/Communism expansionism on the continent and building 
ideological affiliations with African countries” (SIMEON, 2010, p. 58).  
It wasn’t until the second term of the Clinton Administration (1997-2001) that Africa 
started to gain a new significance, “even if was still seen through the lens of ad hoc 
humanitarianism, rather than in a strategic manner” (LYMAN, 2006).22 The increasing 
emphasis on economic links to Africa and its integration into global economy, have 
been the main principles of Clinton’s foreign policy towards Africa. In order to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Statements of General Charles Wald, U.S. National Security Interests in Africa event, 2004. Available 
at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/appearance/480375388 	  
22
 LYMAN, P., (2006),“A strategic approach to terrorism” in WALLE (2009, p. 5). 
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encourage trade and investment, the Clinton administration adopted a trade bill, The 
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) (2000), designed to liberalise the trade 
between the U.S. and eligible African countries. 23 Besides this, high priority was given 
to security issues and to the promotion of democratic enlargement.24 In spite of the 
continuing efforts of President Clinton to create a more effective African policy, the 
truth is that it was never defined in the context of a long-term strategy. 
 Over the course of the Bush administration (2001-2009), Africa was perceived as being 
“a scar” on the conscience of the world. Thus, because of moral imperative obligation of 
the U.S., the grants for humanitarian intervention associated with poverty reduction and 
aid driving, rather than investment, have substantially increased.25 Nevertheless, the 
events of 9/11 led the Bush administration to engage with Africa from a “war on terror” 
perspective, increasing the foreign aid and its military presence in various regions, 
especially in the Sahel and East Africa. However, despite the adoption of a large 
number of new development programs26 African policy under the Bush administration 
continued with the failures of previous administrations. The absence of a careful 
strategic vision and lack of coordination between the different agencies prevented the 
establishment of a coherent and articulated policy in the African countries (WALLE, 
2009, p. 11). Only by the end of his second term (2004-2009) and due to the potential 
growing importance of African oil, did Africa become a new strategic importance for 
U.S. interests. Coincidently, it was then that the U.S. seemed to finally understand the 
growing magnitude of Chinese influence in Africa.  
The mandate of President Obama brought high expectation, even if unrealistic. Early in 
his term, Obama indicated that he planned to develop a set of more comprehensive and 
effective policies towards Africa attempting to mix the economic and security interests 
in the region with some adjustments to the development agenda. On his visit to Ghana 
in 2009, Obama highlighted the importance of good governance arguing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Currently covering 39 countries, AGOA’s main aim was to encourage trade with sub-Saharan countries 
providing trade preferences for quota and duty-free for about 1800 products expanding the benefits under 
the Generalized System of Preferences. 	  
24 Democratic enlargement represents the link between the expansion of democracy and the spread of 
market economies. About the spread of democracy in Africa see also COHEN H.J. (2011), “Democratizing 
Africa: Two decades of U.S. Policy”, American Foreign Policy Interests, Vol.33, No.5; and BRINKLEY, 
D. (1997), “Democratic enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine”, Foreign Policy, 116.	  
25 U.S. aid to SSA grew from $2.3 billion in the fiscal year 2002 to $10.7 billion in 2008 (see figure 
No.3). 	  
26 For instance: President’s Emergency Program for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), Millennium Challenge 
Corporation (MCC).  
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that“Development depends upon good governance.[…]And that is a responsibility that 
can only be met by Africans". 27 The visit of the Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton 
(2009), on the other hand, was directed to more specific economic issues. As Johnnie 
Carson puts it“In this time of economic crisis, it is important that the United States and 
Africa work cooperatively as a major trading partners” (cited in ORI, 2009) 
While U.S. African policy under the Obama administration seems to be more engaging, 
it is also clear that it has stayed consistent with the long-term trend and interests. 
Numerous programs from the Bush administration have been kept in place, such as 
Africa Command (AFRICOM), and key allies on the continent have not changed much 
(WHITE, 2010, p. 27). In reality Obama's strategy in Africa is a solidification of 
existing policy rather than a statement of new policy. 28 Nevertheless, today more than 
ever Africa is becoming a priority region for U.S. interests.   
 
2.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  U.S.	  INTERESTS	  TOWARDS	  AFRICA	  
The U.S. interests in Africa can be classified into three main groups: (i) economic 
interests; (ii) geopolitical interests; (iii) geostrategic and security interests.  
  2.1. Economic Interests  
There is no doubt that natural resources, especially oil, are the key motives that brought 
together the U.S. and China in getting involved in Africa. As Walter Kansteiner, the 
assistant secretary of State for Africa noted, “African oil is of national strategic interest 
to us”.29 This growing importance of oil was highlighted as top priority for the U.S. due 
to some factors that should be mentioned: “(i) the rising domestic energy demand, (ii) 
new discoveries and production of oil in Africa, (iii) and new players moving into the 
continent” (YI-CHONG, 2008, p. 19); (iv) the growing instability from traditional 
American suppliers, such as Middle East. Currently more than 20% of the U.S.’ 
imported oil has its origins in Africa.30 New oil and gas discoveries, especially in West 
African countries, such as Nigeria, and Angola, have made the continent more attractive 
to the U.S.31 In addition to oil and gas interests, there are many other natural resources 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27Accra International Conference Center, 2009. See text at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-to-the-Ghanaian-Parliament/  
28 About U.S. policy in Africa under the Obama Administration see also WALLE (2009).	  
29 Quoted in (CRAWLEY, 2002)  
30 See Figure No.4 
31 See figure No.5 
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of extremely high importance to the U.S. economy, such as raw gems, and precious 
metals and minerals. Besides this, the U.S. is also seeking to expand its trade and 
investments in Africa and this is illustrated, in part by the expansion of total U.S. trade 
(imports plus exports) with sub-Saharan-Africa (SSA). Since 2000 U.S.-Africa trade has 
increased 221% growing from $29.4 billion in 2000 to over $94 billion in 2011.32 In the 
year 2000, trade with Africa made up 1,5 % of total U.S. global trade, and Africa’s 
share had grown to 2,6% by 2011 (JONES and WILLIAMS, 2012, p. 8) However, 
unlike China, which is engaging with Africa by using economic instruments, the U.S. is 
less involved in promoting strong business ties in Africa. In fact, Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) has been largely stagnant. SSA countries are relatively minor 
destination of U.S. FDI. Africa, as a whole hosts about 1% of total U.S. FDI33 being 
largely concentrated in mining and extractive industries, which together comprise some 
$29 billion of the $54 billion total stock of U.S. FDI in Africa.34   
2.2. Geopolitical Interests  
Beyond the economic interests, the U.S. is increasingly seeking political and diplomatic 
support of African countries in the UN and WTO willing at the same time to counter 
attempts by others to do so. However due to the lack of a comprehensive diplomatic 
representation in Africa states,35 the U.S. has had difficulty in getting political support 
from African governments. The emergence of a proactive Chinese policy in the region, 
the disastrous effects of the Iraq war, and the Bush administration’s rhetorical 
commitment to unilateralism, weakened the U.S.’ reputation in the region (WALLE, 
2009, p. 14). Many countries prefer China as a partner, since it does not interfere in the 
affairs of other countries. There is also some evidence that by increasing their presence 
on the African continent, the U.S. is trying to reduce China’s growing international 
influence, since the U.S. acknowledges China as having the capability to threaten its 
global dominance and unipolarity (SIMEON, 2010, p. 63).36 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 See figure No.6 
33 See figure No.7 
34 See figure No. 8 
35According to Walle the U.S. diplomatic presence in Africa has declined due to the ”worsening 
institutional fragmentation in the foreign policy apparatus, contradictions in policy and the decline in the 
state Department’s institutional capacity” (WALLE, 2009, p.3) 
36 China’s rise has led to” China’s threat theory” according to which it is inconceivable to China to have a 
peaceful rise and will inevitably be a threat to the U.S.  
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2.3. Geostrategic and security interests  
A number of security issues, especially counterterrorism, became priority in the list of 
U.S. interests in Africa. After the bombing of U.S. embassies in Nairobi (Kenya) and 
Dar es Salam (Tanzania) in 1998 and the attacks of 9/11 the United States realized that 
Africa posed a serious security threat.37 The “war on terrorism”, based on the idea that 
weak states can bring instability to Africa nations and the fear that al-Qaeda-type 
organizations could become established in African failed states, has been Washington’s 
rhetoric to justify its growing military presence in Africa. The National Security 
Strategy of 2002 is an example of these terrorist concerns: “In Africa promise and 
opportunity sit side by side with disease, war and desperate poverty. This threatens both 
a core value of the United States – preserving human dignity – and our strategic 
priority – combating global terror” (THE WHITE HOUSE, 2002). Under these 
circumstances the U.S. considers to have the moral obligation to ensure stability in 
Africa, leading it to install military programs in several countries. In 2007, in an attempt 
to find an appropriate response in fighting terrorism, the Bush administration announced 
the creation of AFRICOM38 aimed to protect and defend the national security interests 
of the United States by strengthening the defense capabilities of African states in order 
to deter and defeat transnational threats and to provide a security environment 
conducive to good governance and development.39 More recently, the deployment of 
approximately 100 American military personnel to Uganda, to advise military units in 
capturing or killing the Lord’s Resistance Army leader, Joseph Kony, can’t hide the 
purpose of containing the spread of terrorism in that region. A key question, for some, is 
whether the response to fight this small radical organization has an ulterior motive to 
achieve strategic interests, since this is a region that is becoming a new oil producing 
spot.  
According to some authors, such as Michael Klare and Daniel Volman, the 
establishment of U.S. military bases in strategic African regions also seeks to help to 
ensure the access to natural resources and “fight indigenous forces that might threaten 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Pham, Peter, J. (2007), “Next Front? Evolving U.S.-African Strategic Relations in the “War on 
Terrorism” and Beyond”, Comparative Strategy, 26, pp.39-54, cited in CRUZ and STEPHENS (2010, p. 
199) 
37Prior to AFRICOM’s establishment, U.S. military involvement on the continent was divided among 
three commands: U.S. European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and U.S. 
Pacific Command (PACOM). The command’s area of responsibility (AOR) includes all African countries 
except Egypt.  
39 AFRICOM Mission Statement from the official site http://www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp 	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the free flow of oil exports and other minerals” (KLARE and VOLMAN, 2006, p. 303). 
Additionally, many American and African observers believe that this new political 
enhancement is the beginning of a longer U.S. military presence in Africa, in order to 
indirectly ensure free access to strategic resources; to observe China’s rise closely on 
the continent; and to create a secure environment for oil companies.40 I will return on 
this topic in the next sections.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




	  CHAPTER	  III	  	  
CHINA’S	  PRESENCE	  IN	  AFRICA	  
	  
1. CHINA’S	  FOREIGN	  POLICY	  TOWARDS	  AFRICA	  
Unlike the U.S., which presents a short-term strategy for Africa, China’s 
engagement with Africa has evolved and expanded significantly over the last five 
decades. It was after the Second World War that China started to develop a strong 
political engagement with African countries, providing ambiguous support to the 
independence and liberation movements, in order to affirm itself as the leader of the 
Non-Aligned Movement41 and hoping to strengthen international alliances against the 
capitalist West and the revisionist communist Soviet Union.42 Throughout the 1960’s 
and 1970’s China provided financial aid, technological assistance, medical support and 
scholarships to the African countries.43 However, the aid program was different from 
western approaches, by being based on bilateral and South–South cooperation (POWER 
and MOHAN, 2008, p. 10). 
After a period of relative neglect during the 80’s and 90’s, the turning point was the 
beginning of the century. The year 2000 witnessed an upgrade in Sino-African relations, 
especially with the institutionalization of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC). This forum, based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence44, has been 
an effective instrument of soft power to establish a fair and mutually beneficial 
cooperation and a mechanism through which China is coordinating its activities in 
Africa. The various summits held every three years45 are expected to promote political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Created in 1961, the Non-Aligned Movement includes 120 countries which advocate a struggle against 
imperialism, neo-colonialism, and all forms of foreign aggression and pursue to protect the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity. 
42 KANZA, T.M., (1975), “Chinese and Soviet Aid to Africa; An African View” in VAN DE LOOY, 
(2006, p. 1) 
43 For instance, China’s aid program in Guinea (1960 -1969). Also a total of $120 million in aid was 
committed to Congo-Brazzaville, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Tanzania between 1963-1964. Other projects can 
be mentioned such as: the rail-way that connects Lusaka and Dar es Salaam, the construction of the 
stadium "Friendship" in Benin, Zambia - Tanzania rail-way. 
44(i)mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; (ii) mutual non-aggression; (iii) non-
interference in each other’s internal affairs; (iv) equality and mutual benefit; and (v) peaceful coexistence. 
45 The first summit was held in 2000 in Beijing. The second FOCAC Summit was held in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia, in 2003. The 2006 FOCAC Summit was held in Beijing. In 2009 the Summit was held in Sharm 
El Sheik in Egypt and in 2012 in Beijing. See figure No.9 
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dialogue and economic co-operation, with the long-term aim of common economic 
development and prosperity.46 Thus, the Sino-African relations, defined by the President 
Zeming are based on the principles of: ‘‘sincere friendship, equality, solidarity and 
cooperation, common development and being oriented to the future’’.47  
It is also worth noting the great emphasis that China has given to the historical context 
and to the evocation of political solidarity in its relationship with Africa, which are 
carefully employed to suggest a shared sense of identity as fellow third world states and 
also to present the “Chinese model” of development as a successful one (ALDEN and 
ALVES, 2008).48 The Chinese model, known also as "Beijing Consensus", tends to 
serve as an example for many countries seeking development and maintaining their self-
determination. China’s aid and economic cooperation differ, from the Traditional 
Western models, both in their content and in the norms of aid practice. China’s policy 
towards Africa is premised on respect for sovereignty and “non-interference” in national 
affairs, which differentiates it from western approaches that inevitably come with 
conditions (POWER and MOHAN, 2008, p. 17). Thus, its development assistance and 
economic support are apparently unconditional and does not require the respect for 
western values of good governance or human rights like the Washington Consensus 
does. 49  
Furthermore, authors like Chris Patten argue that while the western approach is based 
on an idealistic view of good intentions, the Chinese paradigm is much more objective, 
pragmatic, flexible and effective (PATTEN, 2009). While the West determines what 
Africa needs, adopting general plans with little adjustment to demand, Chinese strategy 
is based on research providing what local people need, and adopting plans to local 
conditions, which “gives it a great deal of credibility as a partner with relevant recent 
experience”. (BRAUTIGAM, 2009, p. 11) 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 (FOCAC, 2009)  
47 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2002. 
48 About China’s model of development see also (COUNCIL, 2011) 
http://english.gov.cn/official/2011-09/06/content_1941354.htm  
49 Washington Consensus policies are usually seen as a shift from state-led dirigisme to market oriented 
policies, whose principles are based on the structural change of the entire society, requiring good 
governance, the respect for the human rights, a transparent economy based on free market, etc. 
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2. CHINA’S	  INTERESTS	  IN	  AFRICA	  
From a materialistic point of view, the discourse of mutual interdependence reveals 
at the same time the economic and commercial nature of China’s foreign policy towards 
Africa. This relates to the idea that Africa’s resources are important to China’s growth 
and that the engagement with Africa is a win-win situation for both parties (ANSHAN, 
2006).50 
This renewed attention towards Africa was driven by a set of strategic interests. Firstly, 
like the U.S., China needs to ensure the access to energy resources, minerals and 
agricultural products, which are essential for its economic growth. After the U.S., China 
is the second largest oil consumer in the world and the importance of Africa as a top oil 
supplier for China has grown exponentially, as shown by figures No.10 and No.11, with 
Angola being at the moment, the main supplier of China’s oil imports.  
Secondly, China seeks to expand its economic relations with Africa. The favorable 
conditions with access to the African markets, and in some cases the weaknesses of 
some African states is extremely attractive for China’s economic expansion. China’s 
economic engagement with African countries combines three main elements: aid, trade 
and investment. Chinese aid, which consists of grants, zero-interests loans, debt relief 
and concessional loans, is mostly perceived as development projects to produce quick 
and tangible results, which enable China to gain political influence in African 
countries.51  
Nevertheless, it is the trade transactions between China and Africa that provide the most 
powerful evidence of China’s emerging economic interests on the continent. Chinese-
African trade has grown rapidly since 2000, reaching $160 billion in 2011 from just $9 
billion in 2000, surpassing the U.S.52 China’s share in Africa’s total trade has also been 
extraordinary, increasing to 13% from 3% a decade ago (JONES and WILLIAMS, 
2012). Moreover, China’s FDI stock in Africa in 2010 reached more than $13 billion.53 
China is also Africa’s largest single source of imports, while the U.S. is its largest 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Anshan, L. (2006) “The Emergence of China in the China-Africa Relations Context: Criticism of Three 
International Perspectives”, Journal of World Economics and Politics, cited in POWER and MOHAN, 
(2008, p. 17). 
51 See figure No.12. See also SAMY, 2010 
52 See figure No.13  
53 See figure No.14.  
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export destination.54 This economic trend in China’s relationship with Africa is built 
upon its need for natural resources. The evidence of this is that fossil fuels and raw 
materials represent roughly 4/5 of Chinese imports originating from Africa and there are 
around ten African countries which account for 76% of all trade relations with China.55 
Moreover, the financial support from Chinese banks, including China Export-Import 
Bank has had a vital role in strengthening its economic relations with Africa. It provides 
loans to governments and supports Chinese companies, which are normally state-
owned, to invest in Africa through export credits, loans for overseas projects and 
international guarantees.56 Furthermore, in order to take full advantage of the Sino-
African cooperation, China has also established commercial and investment hubs called 
Special Economic Zones (SEZ), "which provide “infrastructure corridors” that link 
African producers and markets in China" (SHINN and EISENMAN, 2008, p. 5). Its 
low interest loans and its funding mechanism of exchange, known as the Angola 
Mode,57 have received strong criticisms among American officials, who argue that by 
pursuing this policy China allows countries to escape IMF and World Bank58 
regulations and also restricts the access of U.S. companies in Africa. 
Thirdly, China seeks to become a major international player promoting a multi-polar 
world, in contrast to the American “bipolar system” (XU YI-CHONG, 2008), and at the 
same time wants to develop good relationships with all African countries to gain 
political support in regional and international forums. And lastly, China is seeking to 
end Taiwan’s international recognition and replacing it with the recognition of Beijing. 
Generally speaking, Chinese interests in Africa are both economic and political 
interests.  
Concluding, over the past decade while the U.S. has all too often ignored SSA in its 
policies, Beijing has quietly established relationships with the continent’s political and 
business elites. The pursuit of its national and international interests instigate a more 
active and globally orientated foreign policy based on its historical traditions with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 About China’s trade in Africa see also RENARD, M.F. (2011), “China’s trade and FDI in Africa”, 
African Development Bank Group, Working Paper, No. 126, May. 
55 See figure No.15 
56 See also (SHINN and EISENMAN, 2008) 
57 This is an exclusive economic funding mechanism in Sino-African cooperation: the payment of the 
loan for infrastructure projects is made in terms of natural resources. 
58 For instance, in 2006, Angola refused the funds of the IMF, in part thanks to the high development 
assistance and investment that China has injected, or the situation of Sudan, which has rejected Western 
threats and sanctions with respect to the strong violation of human rights.  
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African countries and to a certain point on ideational factors59 operated under the 
framework of a win-win cooperation.  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 By ideational factors I mean norms, identities, values and beliefs, identified by constructivists theorists 




CHAPTER	  IV	  	  
U.S.	  RESPONSES	  TO	  CHINA’S	  PRESENCE	  IN	  AFRICA	  
After a brief review of the U.S. and China's foreign policy and interests in Africa, 
this chapter will analyze: (i) the implications of Chinese initiatives to U.S. foreign 
policy in Africa and; (ii) the various American responses to China's presence on the 
continent. The analysis of these parameters will be based on three main dimensions: 
economic, security and political. So far, it seems that the United States doesn’t have an 
effective strategy to counter China’s influence in Africa. What can be seen is rather an 
assembled set of measures aimed to limit China’s dominance. Moreover, U.S.-China 
interaction on the continent can be viewed as an action-reaction sequence.60  
1.	  ECONOMIC	  DIMENSION	  	  
The Chinese initiatives and economic successes discussed in the previous chapter 
have been followed closely by the U.S. In 2000, the same year that China established 
the FOCAC, the Clinton Administration introduced a comprehensive U.S. trade and 
investment policy for the African continent - the African Growth and Opportunity Act 
(AGOA). Since then, AGOA has been the main economic act to strengthen the U.S.-
Africa relationship, and the only successful economic response to China in Africa and it 
also has had a predominant role in acquiring oil and natural resources. In fact, energy 
resources have dominated the products imported from Africa under AGOA. Since 2000 
exports under AGOA have increased from $8.15 billion in 2001 to $53 billion in 
201161, 90% of which have been energy related products.62 Also, during the first term of 
the Bush Administration (2001-2004), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) 
(2004), a multi-billion dollar program which provides assistance for “compact 
agreements” to reduce poverty and stimulate the economic growth, was established.63  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60I want to use this term, used mainly in physics, to better illustrate the American-Sino interaction on 
African continent. Based on Newton's Third Law of physics: "Every Action has an equal and opposite 
reaction". There is a great similarity between Newtonian force and diplomatic action. As in physics, every 
action in bilateral and multilateral relations (for instance: China’s relation with African countries) can 
produce a response from the political elite of another country which is pursuing similar interests (in this 
case the U.S.) which is pursuing similar interests.	  
61 See figure No. 16	  
62 See figure No.17. About US energy security see also GROUP, (2001)	  
63 MCC is currently working in 40 countries worldwide. In SSA, MCC has signed compacts agreements 
with 5 countries - Mali, Madagascar, Cape Verde, Benin, and Ghana. 
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The Obama Administration has also been involved in promoting a more proactive U.S 
economic response to China in Africa. Like his predecessors G.W.Bush and Bill 
Clinton, Obama has embraced AGOA to demonstrate that the U.S. commitment is more 
than just foreign aid, military ties, and special bilateral deals. It is a partnership in 
building the capacity for transformational change. On his official visits to Africa in 
2009, Obama has clearly expressed his wish to help African states to develop 
economically and treat them as potential valuable international partners. Furthermore, 
Hillary Clinton also visited Africa in 2011, voicing U.S. desire for sustainable 
investments in Africa: “We want a relationship of partnership not patronage, of 
sustainability, not quick fixes. We want to establish strong foundation to attract new 
investment” (SECRETARY OF STATE, 2011). 
It is important to note, the official visits have been a mechanism used by the U.S. 
leaders to contribute to a greater U.S. engagement in Africa. However, the number of 
U.S. official visits to Africa in contrast with the Chinese has been highly inferior, 
showing once again how different methods drive different foreign policies.64 	  
Although AGOA has contributed to increase US-Africa trade, “the achievements of 
AGOA have by and large been below expectations” (BROOKINGS, 2011, p. 3). In 
particular, it has not contributed to any visible economic transformation of African 
economies and has not been able to stimulate American investments in Africa.65 
More recently, in an attempt to encourage the U.S. and Africa to do business together, 
the White House has announced a new U.S. Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa.66 In an 
attempt to spread the pillars of this new strategy, on July 31st 2012, the Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton embarked on an official journey to several African countries. 
Apart from strengthening the U.S.–Africa commercial relations, Clinton’s visit has also 
been interpreted as an attempt to counter China’s influence in Africa. According to 
Viano, “The U.S. wants to use this visit as a manoeuvre to limit the influence of China 
[…] cautioning African leaders not to strike deals too easily with China” (VIANO, 
2012).67 This strategy comes only a few weeks after the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing. However, coming a bit too late in the game, only six 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Figures No.18 and No.19 
65 See also CARGILL, T., and VINES, A., (2010), “Sub-Saharan Africa: Providing strategic vision or 
fire-fighting?” 
66 About U.S. strategy for SSA see (THE WHITE HOUSE, 2012, (a)). 




months left in his term, Obama’s strategy is rather a solidification of existing policy 
than a new policy, and it doesn’t really establish new economic initiatives and major 
innovations in US-Africa trade relations. 
It’s evident that the visits, speeches and meetings haven’t resulted in delivering major 
economic agreements and diplomatic initiatives, apart from small programs, grants and 
loans. The institutional fragmentation and the lack of coordination between many 
American agencies deeply contrasts with the Chinese way of acting, making it difficult 
for the U.S. to achieve concrete economic objectives, especially as China gives African 
countries an alternative way of doing business and more bargaining power. 
2.	  SECURITY	  AND	  MILITARY	  DIMENSION	  	  
Apart from economic responses, the U.S. has also been using military initiatives 
and tactics, aimed mainly at combating terrorism and containing local threats to try to 
secure the safe flow of natural resources from Africa. The U.S. has used a variety of 
security assistance programs and established military bases in Africa to enhance its 
military influence68. As a result, the U.S. is now involved directly and indirectly in 
military and surveillance operations against an expanding list of regional enemies. They 
include: al-Qaeda in the Maghreb in North Africa; the Islamist movement Boko Haram 
in Nigeria; possible al-Qaeda-linked militants in post-Qaddafi Libya; Mali’s Islamist 
rebels of the Ansar Dine, al-Shabaab in Somalia; Joseph Kony Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA) in the Central African Republic and Uganda; and guerrillas from al-Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula across the Gulf of Aden in Yemen (TURSE, 2012). However, the 
fight against terrorism can be seen as a strategic tactic whose goals go beyond mere 
"war on terrorism". 
Many authors69 argue that at a strategic level by increasing military presence in Africa 
the U.S. may target the access to natural resources and indirectly China’s intensive 
presence in Africa. Although empirically it is more difficult to examine this, China is at 
least one of the potential reasons for U.S. military presence in Africa, and the US Africa 
Command (AFRICOM), seen by China as “unpleasant and out of sorts”70, has been the 
main instrument in achieving this goal. Peter Pham stated in 2007 that AFRICOM’s 
main objective is “protecting access to hydrocarbons and other strategic 
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69 For instance HUNT (2007); PHAM J.P. (2008); HABIYAREMYE (2011)	  
70 "U.S. Embarrassment in Africa,” 
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resources…ensuring that no other interested third parties, such as China, India, Japan, 
or Russia, obtain monopolies or preferential treatment”.71 By using U.S. troops as part 
of the new African Command, some authors argue that the U.S. is intending to increase 
its presence in certain oil-rich areas, such as Sudan, Libya, Angola, Nigeria, Uganda, 
Kenya, ensuring in this way a beneficial investment climate for American oil firms and 
weaking China’s relations with African governments. Moreover, AFRICOM’s presence 
may threaten the political influence that China has established both on the continent and 
in international bodies. 
Another consideration in the implementation of AFRICOM is to help to control 
strategic waterways and important ports around the continent. Since mid-2000 the U.S. 
Navy has significantly increased its presence in African waters, especially on the West 
African coast. In addition to other goals, such as combating piracy, illegal fishing and 
illegal trafficking, the fact remains that oil forms the primary interest and determines the 
nature of U.S. policy towards West Africa (and AFRICOM activities)72. In 2011 the 
Ambassador J. Anthony Holmes argued that the U.S. wants to “ensure that the system 
operates without disruption”.73 Thus, some authors believe that “U.S. navy ships 
patrolling these areas could help reestablish maritime security” (CRUZ and 
STEPHENS, 2010), and enable Washington to secure its strategic interests. On the other 
hand, some analysts argue that by expanding its military “arsenal” in African waters, the 
U.S. Navy is strategically trying to control in the future the transportation of oil and 
other minerals from Africa to China.74  
U.S. Officials claim that their increasing military engagement in Africa is a strategic 
partnership for cooperation, development and support for fighting terrorism. By 
incorporating military and security interests with development, the U.S. aims to 
embrace a strategy different than former policy mainly focused on a “hard power” 
policy. According to some authors, “AFRICOM could be part of a greater U.S. foreign 
policy strategy for “smart power” in the developing world” in order to win trust among 
African countries (CRUZ and STEPHENS, 2010, p. 195). The activities intended to 
fight terrorism and provide security could be classified as ‘hard power’, whereas other 
programs, such as military training and education programs, and humanitarian projects, 
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72 See also (KLARE and VOLMAN, 2006) 
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74 See for instance Michael Klare (2008), Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of 
Energy, A Holt Paperback, New York,  
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are intended to build ‘soft power’. As Nye observes, “the military can sometimes play 
an important role in the generation of soft power” (NYE, 2008, p. 106). However, the 
AFRICOM military programs don’t seem to generate soft power, since suspicions and 
skepticism has been raised regarding its main motives, making it harder to find partners 
for the implementation of the program.75  The diminished credibility of American policy 
as a result of the Iraq war, as well as the incapacity of the Department of Defense in 
adequately explaining how the command will help African countries, aroused a fear that 
the U.S. was militarizing its foreign policy in Africa.76 As Michelle Ruiters, a senior 
researcher at the Institute for Global Dialogue puts it “AFRICOM would destabilize an 
already fragile continent and region, which would be forced to engage with U.S. 
interests on military matters”. 77 China, on the other hand, at the moment does not use 
military pressure to achieve agreements with African countries; it uses a “soft power” 
policy based on flexibility, consistency and pragmatism, which in turn provides 
transparency, legitimacy, accountability, visibility and recognition among African 
countries. 
In spite of the attempts of U.S. efforts in projecting a soft power message, its military 
presence in Africa is still questionable.  
 
3.	  POLITICAL	  DIMENSION	  
In order to better understand U.S. actions in Africa, it is important to acknowledge 
the rivalry between the U.S. and China in the international context. Since the late 80’s, 
China’s rise has being viewed with uncertainty and anxiousness in the U.S. Its rapid 
economic growth, its rising power and influence in the world, “raised the specter of a 
new global rivalry for power and influence (FRIEDBERG, 2005, p. 7). The U.S. 
prevalent debate has focused on two main schools of thoughts: liberalism - essentially 
optimistic - and realism - distinctly pessimistic. The main opinion in the U.S. is that a 
rising China has reshaped the existing global order and challenged the global leadership 
of the U.S. (ZHOU, 2011, p. 626). American pessimists from the realist school argue 
that China possesses a “big challenge”78 for the U.S. and a great power rivalry between 
China and the U.S. is inevitable. Additionally, realists defend that China’s growing 
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economic power and influence in the world, will translate into increased military power 
and allow China to reshape the rules and institutions of the international system to better 
serve its interests. 79  
On the other side, proponents of the liberal perspective suggest that U.S. officials 
should pursue an engagement policy instead of a containment one, since they believe 
that by reinforcing bilateral economic exchanges and institutional ties will create shared 
interests and reduce the uncertainty of a belligerent China. Liberal authors consider that 
the expansion of China’s involvement in the international institutions will promote 
communication and mutual understanding, reducing at the same time the prospects for 
conflict. 80  
These two main visions have also influenced the debate on China’s engagement in 
Africa. There are four key concerns that dominate U.S. discussions with respect to the 
Chinese presence in Africa. The first major concern is defended by the realist followers 
who argue that the growing Chinese interest in Africa will directly affect the U.S. 
interests in ensuring access to African oil. According to BROOKES and SHIN (2006), 
Chinese investment in the African oil sector is a way of deliberately blocking the 
supplies to importing countries and keeping the U.S. out of African markets, advocating 
that the only way to ensure U.S. interests in Africa is through increased economic and 
military presence on the continent. 	  
The second concern is focused on structural aspects regarding how China conducts 
business in Africa - calling into question the fundamental values of the West, 
particularly human rights, transparency and good governance practices.81 Some authors 
fear that its strong sense of autonomy, independence, and no strings attached policy can 
easily cease the long efforts of the U.S. to "improve" the African regimes regarding 
their transparency, governance and corruption. 
Furthermore, another realist perspective argues that Chinese expansion in Africa is part 
of an overall strategy to challenge U.S. leadership in the world. According to this 
vision, China’s growing economic and strategic power contributes to a major change in 
the balance of power over strategic and economic influence on the African continent, 
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which can bring a high potential for conflict and a change in terms of world 
leadership.82 
 Finally, a more liberal and optimistic view, seeking to calm "the spirits", claims that 
‘‘the current state of China-Africa links is not a significant foreign policy threat to 
America’s interest in Africa” (YI-CHONG, 2008). According to this latter view, 
China’s engagement in Africa should be seen as an opportunity for the U.S. since there 
are many areas for cooperation between the two countries.83  
By analyzing these political views, it is possible to see that the U.S. is also using 
political strategies as a response to China’s activities in Africa. Although U.S. officials 
do not mention any country by name, often their remarks in official visits and speeches 
can be interpreted as a swipe at China. Hillary Clinton in her visit to Africa in 2011 
mentioned “It is easy to come in, take out natural resources, pay off leaders and leave.” 
Moreover, she characterized China as a new imperialist power in Africa stating that, 
“Africa must beware of “new colonialism” as China expands ties there and focus 
instead on partners able to help build proactive capacity on the continent”.  
Furthermore, the Chinese separation of business interests from political concerns is seen 
by the Americans as an obstacle to African democratization. U.S. officials warn that 
China’s support for dictatorial regimes undermines development initiatives on the 
continent. U.S. officials aim to convince the Africans that economic progress is possible 
even with high standards for human rights, democracy and good governance. Winning 
the hearts of the people and African officials by convincing them that America is a force 
of “good” which offers stability and security, has been the key play of the Obama 
administration. Nevertheless, the projection of good governance and democracy is 
sometimes called into question, especially when energy and security interests are at 
stake. The U.S. relationship with African dictatorial regimes, rich in natural resources, 
is important to U.S. energy and security, and has been recognized by Obama, as he 
mentioned that,“our security interests will sometimes require that we work with regimes 
with which we have fundamental disagreements”.84 The U.S. may often support oil rich 
countries that may have bad human rights and good governance records as long as they 
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guarantee a steady flow of oil to the U.S. This view is also shared by the Chinese 
officials who perceive the U.S. zeal on democracy and good governance as hypocritical. 
In brief, it is obvious that the U.S., like China, intends to pursue a “soft power” policy 
with African countries. Both countries have been very active on the African continent, 
but always cautious in their speeches and in diplomatic and political initiatives. In 
reality the two pursue their interests always “under the veil of moral superiority” (YI-











Before moving to the conclusions drawn from this dissertation, let’s recall the 
central research question: Has Chinese presence in Africa prompted an increase in 
American involvement in the continent, and if so, in what way?  
First of all, it’s important to note that the competition for Africa is not recent, quite the 
contrary. Currently the "new scramble" for is taking place among the world's big powers 
and emerging countries, which are competing for commercial, political and geostrategic 
interests. Both China and the U.S. are using all their political and diplomatic efforts to 
ensure their interests on the continent.  
Secondly, it is evident that since 2000, the U.S. - which comparing with other countries 
has never had a huge involvement and interest in Africa - has been increasing its 
presence on the continent, resulting in a competition with China. The analysis of various 
factors made throughout this research leads us to conclude that the U.S. involvement in 
African is largely due to the prominent presence of China on the continent. However, it 
would be a mistake to conclude that this is the only reason. Although there is a positive 
correlation between the two variables, the fast-growing U.S. presence in Africa can also 
be associated to a number of strategic interests important for the U.S. Economically, 
Africa is an increasingly important supplier of natural resources and a region with great 
investment and business opportunities. Besides this, the U.S. is seeking political support 
from African countries and has shown a great concern for security issues and instability 
on the continent, taking actions to combat terrorism and maintain security.  
Thirdly, although, the U.S. doesn’t have a clear and proactive strategy for China’s 
presence in Africa, there is an increase need to counter its [China] influence on the 
continent. By doing that the U.S. is intending to increase its diplomatic, military and 
economic influence throughout Africa, which will give Washington a better position to 
gain, for the first time, political dominance in the region, to ensure the access to natural 
resources and to expand its military actions against the “war on terror”.  
The competition to achieve these strategic objectives emanates from the nature of this 
rivalry as well as the structure of the present international system. In this sense one can 
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conclude that the subject of the study discussed in this dissertation follows the 
theoretical realist approach initially mentioned, whereby both the U.S. and China will 
try to gain a position where they can use all their power to promote their interests, since 
there is no one else that they can count on. In effect both countries are trying to gain 
relative power by different forms. On one hand, China is using its “soft power” policy 
based on non-interference into the internal affairs of a nation and no strings attached 
approach, which gives China a marked advantage over the U.S. in their interaction with 
Africa. On the other hand, to counter China’s influence and ensure its strategic interests, 
the U.S. has been using diplomatic, military and economic instruments to strengthen 
partnerships with its new allies and “friends” and increase its military capabilities on the 
continent; develop new economic initiatives with certain countries. These initiatives 
highlight the action-reaction effect, which I believe to be the main characteristic of 
American -Sino competition on the continent. Furthermore, I can also conclude that the 
American actions have been developed under a political strategy that can be summed up 
as "follow my words, not my deeds”. This means that, while the U.S. is using all its 
economic and military initiatives, it is clear that it doesn’t intend to attack China 
directly, being cautious on their official speeches for fears of losing the support of 
African countries.    Above all, the U.S. intends to use its values of democracy, respect 
for human right and good governance, sometimes under an almost ideological 
discourse, to encourage Africa to move away from China, showing that while China is 
above all interested in Africa’s resources, the U.S. is concerned with the Africa’s 
economic, political and democratic progress.	   
The basic morality and the return of soft power seem to shape the resources scramble in 
Africa. The instruments of power used by the Obama administration can be identify as 
being part from a “smart power” strategy, which has become the core principle of 
Obama’s foreign policy in Africa, but also in the world. When analyzing the American- 
Sino competition from a global perspective, one can say that the “smart power” policy 
is the recognition of the “relativization” of the American Power and the fact that, in 
Nye’s phrase, “the U.S. can’t go alone”.  Theoretically speaking I would say that this 
competition represents a combination of neoliberalism and defensive realism, 
characterized by cautiousness, cooperation, and alliance-building. 
Is this political strategy a new way of engaging the competition for natural resources in 
Africa? Is Africa a testing ground for both powers to decide their global position? 
Although there is too early to know the answers to these questions, the truth is that, 
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China's interest in Africa caused a sort of alert among Western powers and African 
traditional partners, and this dissertation is the proof of that.  
This dissertation covers only a few main aspects of the American-Sino rivalry. 
Hopefully, however, it has managed to set the ground for further research on this matter. 
Therefore it is recommended that further studies be conducted in the following areas: 
understand the impact of the competition on stability in Africa; comprehend how 
competition for strategic interests in Africa is reshaping the global, political, and 
economic order; further research is need to determine the real dimension of the U.S. 
military involvement in Africa, and how this is affecting China’s activity in Africa; and 
whether or not this competition could precipitate conflicts among major power.   
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Source: Yager R., Bermudez-Lugo O., Mobbs P.M., Newman H.R. and Wilburn D.R. (2005), The Mineral Industries 
of Africa, USGS: p. 1.14-1.15 (online: http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2005/myb3-sum-2005-
africa.pdf) 
 
Figure No.2 – Africa’s Oil Proved Reserves 1990-2010 
 
   At end 1990   At end 2000   At end 2009     At end 2010      
   Thousand   Thousand   Thousand   Thousand   Thousand      
   million   million   million   million   million   Share    R/P  
   barrels   barrels   barrels   tonnes   barrels   of total   ratio  
Angola 
                           
1,6  
                    
6,0  
                        
13,5  
                  
1,8  
               
13,5  1,0% 
           
20,0  
Chad  –  
                    
0,9  
                          
1,5  
                 
0,2  
                 
1,5  0,1% 





                           
0,8  
                    
1,7  
                          
1,9  
                 
0,3  
                 
1,9  0,1% 
           
18,2  
Egypt 
                           
3,5  
                    
3,6  
                          
4,4  
                 
0,6  
                 
4,5  0,3% 




 –  
                    
0,8  
                          
1,7  
                 
0,2  
                 
1,7  0,1% 
           
17,1  
Gabon 
                           
0,9  
                    
2,4  
                          
3,7  
                 
0,5  
                 
3,7  0,3% 
           
41,2  
Libya 
                         
22,8  
                  
36,0  
                        
46,4  
                  
6,0  
               
46,4  3,4% 
           
76,7  
Nigeria 
                         
17,1  
                  
29,0  
                        
37,2  
                  
5,0  
               
37,2  2,7% 
           
42,4  
Sudan 
                           
0,3  
                    
0,6  
                          
6,7  
                 
0,9  
                 
6,7  0,5% 
           
37,8  
Tunisia 
                           
1,7  
                    
0,4  
                          
0,4  
                 
0,1  
                 
0,4  ◆ 
           
14,6  
Other Africa 
                           
0,9  
                    
0,7  
                          
0,7  
                 
0,2  
                 
2,3  0,2% 
           
44,2  
Total Africa                          
58,7  
                  
93,4  
                      
130,3  
                
17,4  
             
132,1  9,5% 
           
35,8  
◆	 ‒	 less	 than	 0,05%	 
Source: BP statistical review World Energy 2011(available on: 
http://www.bp.com/assets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical_energy_rev
iew_2011/STAGING/local_assets/pdf/statistical_review_of_world_energy_full_report_2011.pdf ) 
Mineral	   Share	  of	  world	  (%)	   	  Major	  African	  producers	  
Cobalt	   57	   	  DRC,	  Zambia,	  Morocco	  
Diamond	   53	   	  Botswana,	  DRC,	  South	  Africa,	  Angola,	  Namibia	  
Chromite	   44	   South	  Africa,	  Sudan,	  Zimbabwe	  
Manganese	   39	   	  South	  Africa,	  Gabon,	  Ghana	  
Phosphate	  	   31	   Morocco,	  Tunisia,	  Egypt,	  South	  Africa,	  Senegal	  
Gold	  	   21	   	  South	  Africa,	  Ghana,	  Mali,	  Tanzania	  
Bauxite	   9	   Guinea,	  Sierra	  Leone,	  Ghana	  
Nickel	  	   7,5	   	  South	  Africa,	  Botswana,	  Zimbabwe	  































2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
U.S. Foreign Aid  to Sub-Saharan Africa  
in $ U.S. millions 
U.S. Foreign Aid 
Source: U.S. Overseas loads and grants, USAID  
Figure No.3 – U.S. Foreign aid (2002-2009) 
	  
Figure No. 4  





































	   	  
	  
	  



















Source: 2012, CRS Report for Congress"U.S. Trade and Investment Relations with sub-Saharan Africa 






2009 2010 2011 
U.S. exports 
merchandise 14,638 16,437 20,298 
U.S. imports for 
consumption 47,159 64,351 74,019 
Total trade  80,797 80,788 94,317 
Figure No.6 - U.S. trade with Sub-Saharan Africa  
2009 - 2011 
Source: United State International Trade Commission 
Figure No.7 - Stock of U.S. FDI Abroad, by Destination  





















Figure No.8  
Stock of U.S. FDI in Africa, by Industry Sector, 2010  





	   	  
	  
Figure. No.9  - Overview of commitments made during FOCAC meetings 
FOCAC I (2000) FOCAC II (2003) FOCAC III (2006) FOCAC IV (2009) 
 
Financial commitments 
Debt cancellation of up to RMB 
10 billion for the HIPC and LDC 
countries in Africa within 2 
years. 
 
Trade and investment 
▪ give preference to import of 
African products "in the light of 
demands and conditions of the 
Chinese market" 
▪ ensure operation of Investment 
and Trade Promotion Centres by 
China in Africa and assist 
African states to set up similar 
entities in China. 
▪ establish a China-Africa Joint 
Business Council 
▪ create a China-Africa Products 
Exhibition Centre in China 
▪ China will provide special 
funds to support Chinese 
investments in Africa; 
 
Capacity building 
▪ send additional medical teams 
to Africa, including equipment, 
in order to train local medical 
staff. 
▪ establish an African Human 




In areas including pollution 
control, biodiversity 
conservation, protection of 
forests, fisheries and wildlife 
management 
Financial commitments 
China will continue to 
increase assistance for 
African countries (no 
figures provided); 
 
Trade and investment 
China will grant tariff-free 
access to some 
commodities from LDCs 
 
Capacity building 
China will train up to 
10,000 African personnel 




▪ China will sponsor an art 
festival focussing on 
African arts and a Chinese 
cultural presentation in 
Africa. 
▪ China will hold a China-
Africa Youth Festival in 
China in 2004. 
 
Other 
China will grant Approved 
(Tourism) Destination 
Status to eight African 
countries for Chinese 
citizens who cover their 
own expenses. 
Financial commitments 
▪ Double aid to Africa by 2009 (2006 as 
benchmark year) 
▪ provide US$ 3 billion as preferential 
loans US$ 2 billion as preferential 
buyer‘s credits within 3 years 
▪ provide RMB 300 million (ca. US$ 40 
million) for artemisin (anti-malaria drug), 
▪ Cancel government debt; namely: 
matured interest-free loans due in 2005 
owed by HIPC and LDCs. 
 
Trade and investment 
▪ set up the China-Africa Development 
Fund (CADFund), an investment fund 
with US$ 5 billion capital 
▪ increase the number of zero-tariff 
export items from 190 to 440 for the 30 
least developed African countries 
▪ establish 3 to 5 trade and economic 




Within 3 years: train 15,000 African 
professional, send 100 senior agricultural 
experts, set up 10 special agricultural 
centres, build 30 malaria prevention 
centres, dispatch 300 youth volunteers, 
and increase the number of scholarships 




▪ build an African Union conference 
centre 
▪ build 100 rural schools 
▪ build 30 hospitals 
Financial commitments 
▪ provide US$ 10 billion in 
concessional loans 
▪ provide US$ 1 billion for African 
small and medium size business 
▪ cancel debt associated with interest-
free government loans due to mature 
by the end of 2009 
 
Trade and investment 
▪ duty-free and quota-free treatment 




▪ launch China-Africa science and 
technology partnership, carry out 100 
joint demonstration projects on 
science and technology research and 
receive 100 African post-doctoral 
fellows in China. 
▪ train 20,000 professionals in various 
fields 
▪ increase the number of agricultural 
demonstration centres to 20, send 50 
agricultural technology teams, and 
train 2,000 agricultural experts 
▪ launch a China-Africa joint research 
and exchange programme. 
▪ build 50 China-Africa friendship 
schools and train 1,500 school 
principals; increase government 
scholarships to Africa to 5,500 within 
3 years. 









































	   Source:	  IEA	  
	  
Figure No.11 






























	   	  
Figure No.12 





























Figure No.14  
Chinese FDI Stock to Africa 2003-2010 
(in $ millions)  
Figure No.13  
Chinese – African Trade  


















































Figure No.16 - Exports from AGOA beneficiaries: Total Exports and AGOA and GSP 
Eligible, 2001 - 2011 














Figure No.18  








President Year Country 

























	   	  
	  
	  




Figure No.19  
United States’s official visits to Africa 
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